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As NASA proceeds with its studies, planning amt techmdogy efforts in prepan'ng for tie early tu_tO,-
first century, it seems appropriate to reexamine past programs f_w potential appticabili o, in m_,ting
future national space science and expltrraHon goals and objectites. Both the NaHonal Commission on
Space (NCOS) study and NASA's "Sally Ride sttuly" suggest future programs int_dving returning to the
Moon and establishing man's permanent Imeserwe there, and/or via'ting the platwt Mars in both the
unmanned and manned mode. Regardless of u,hen and which of these new hold initiaHtes is selected
as our next national space goal, implementing these potentially new national thrusts in ._Oace uqll
undoubtedly require the use of both manned and remotely controlled roving vehicles. Tlxorefore, the
purpose of this paper is to raise the consciousness lez_el of the current space explcrration planru, rs to
what, in the early 1970s, u_as a highly successful t_tSng tehicle. During the Apollo program, the tehicle
known as the Lunar Roving Vehicle (LRV) u_as designed for carrAqng tu_ astronauts, their t*u*ls, and
the equ_rnent needed for rudimentary exploration of the M¢mn. This paper contains a dist_4ssion of
the vehicle, its characteristics, and its use on the Moon. Conceit_l_ly, the LRV has the potential to m_,t
some future requirements, ather with relatitely low cost modifications trr via an e1_dutiomary nmte.
lhis aspect , however, is left to those who u_gtdd choose to further stud¥ these options.
INTRODUCTION
Dreams of exploring the universe and traveling in spacc to
other worlds and planets probably go back to the days of Coper-
nicus when he pointed out that the Earth was not the center of
the universe. With the subsequent technical and mathematical
efforts of the early scientists such ms Galileo, Kepler, and Newton,
man became more aware of the universe and the laws that govern
its motions. Thus, from the naive dreams of early man wrapped
in legends and myths, modified by better physical and scientific
understanding, man came to the realization of the possibility of
flight into space. Indeed, the foundation for the investigation of
space was laid through this inauspicious beginning.
The history of the LRV may have begun in the world of science
fiction that had as its roots this evolving notion that man was only
a part of a much larger tmvierse. In 1901 for instance, the Polish
science fiction writer Jersz Zulawski wrote NA Srebrnym Globie
(On a Silvery Globe) in which his space travelers, after landing
on the Moon, used a roving vehicle to perform a traverse that
began at the lunar North Pole and proceeded south through Mare
Frigoris and Mare Imbrium, ending near Mare Vaporum and the
lunar equator--a very ambitious traverse. It then became a
relatively short step from the science fiction writers of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the first primitive steps in
the accomplishment of man's dream of visiting other worlds.
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The evolution of the LRV, from the fiction of these carly
visionaries to the nonfiction of contemporary engineers and
scientists, proceeded via a series of more pragmatic contractor
and government studies conducted primarily during the 1950s
and 1960s. It was during this period of time when dreams,
blended with creativity and technology, sparked with the national
obiective of "landing a man on the Moon in this decade," gave
initial life to what was to become a reality in the 1970s: driving
a car on another planet. To diseu_s "all the _trious concepLs and
studies performed and how tht._se concepts finally led to the
design of an LRV would take far t¢x) long and would not be
particularly relevant to the objective of this paper. However, it
should be mentioned that numeroLts studies were conducted by
organizations such as Boeing, Bendix, Lockheed, (k_neral Motors,
Northrup, and Grumann, just to name a few. These studies
examined configurations of vehicles that included full}, automated
designs with lunar life times of a year and a range of 1000 kin,
manned configurations of four and six wheels, tracked vehicles,
manned flying platforms, mobile laboratories containing a shirt-
sleeve environment for the astronauts, small automated rovers the
size of a suitcase, and machines the size of a bus.
The LRV was not initially part of the earl}, Apollo planning by
NASA, but rather evolved into the agenL3es planning during the
mid-phases of the program. As the milestone of sending a man
to the Moon before the end of the decade of the 1960s became
more realistic with each successful Atx>llo test flight in near-Earth
orbit, and the expected safety margins for the subsequent missions
began to more clearly emerge, plans that would maximize the
scientific return from the M,x)n [x_gan to take on more signif-
icance in NASA's planning, in other words, once the task of
satisfactorily testing the basic Apollo hardware was demonstrated,
NASA's plans for optimizing the return on investment from
subsequent missions to the M¢xm came into clearer focus.
In late May of 1969, the agency planning for an I.RV culminated
in a decision to proceed with development of a light article two
months prior to the first manned lunar landing (Apollo 11 ).
Subsequently, the responsibility for the management tff the dcsigu
and development of the LRV was given to the Marshall Space
Flight Center in Huntsvilie, Alabanla, and in turn to this author.
After open competition during the summer of 1969, followed by
competitive negotiations with the Bendix Corporation and the
Boeing Company, NASA awarded a contract to the Boeing
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Company on October 29, 1969. The contract, among other things,
called for the delivery of a "manned qualified" flight vehicle to
Kennedy ,";pace Center (KSC) for installation into the Apollo 15
spacecraft by March 1971. The first flight article delivery was to
take place a mere 17 months from contract go-ahead, only 22
months from NASA's decision to proceed with the progam.
Because relatively little was known about the conditions on the
lunar surface when the LRV program was initiated, a significant
technical challenge laced not only engineers who established the
technical design requirements, but also the engineers who were
to design, test, and build this marvelous "spacecraft on wheels."
To accomplish this task with a technically sophisticated and re-
liable vehicle in such a short period of time and within extremely
tight budget constraints, new and innovative approaches to the
procurement and management aspects of the program were
required. Given the constraints the program was faced with, it
is probably correct to say that no other program has replicated
or surpassed the track record of this one. However, the
procurement and management aspects of this program are
another study in itself.
With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, the justification and need
for the LRV may' seem unassailable today, but such was not the
case at the time that the go-ahead decision had to be made.
Remember, the crew of Apollo 11 had not yet landed on the
Moon. Reserving 400 to 600 Ib of payload to carry a car to the
Moon did not find favor among some NASA officials, who would
much rather have carried this additional payload as extra
"hovering" fuel for the lunar module (LM). The extra fuel would
have provided more assurance that a safe place to land on the
Moon could be found, thus decreasing the risk that the mission
would have to be aborted at a most critical moment and just short
of the principal objective. The decision to proceed, therefore, was
a brave one to make at that particular time and not, by any means,
a unanimous one within NASA.
The other side of the equation, however, dealt with how much
more ,science could be accomplished if the astronauts had a
relatively f_atigue-free mode of transportation. The use of the LRV
not only increased the distance the astronauts could explore away
from the LM, but also substantially impacted how long the
astronauts would be able to remain outside the LM For instance,
the Apollo 11 crew only traveled about 250yards during their
21.fi hours on the lunar surface. On the other hand, with the first
use of the LRV on Apollo 15, a distance of 17.3 miles was traversed
and by Apollo 17 this was further increased to 22.3 miles. At one
point astronauts were able to work 4.7 miles radial distance away
from the LM through the use of the LRX_ All told, an area similar
to that of Manhattan Island was explored. This was a far cry from
the area of one or two football fields, which represented the limits
prior to the LRV. Also, it might be remembered that a combination
of high metabolic rates and a lack of navigation aids caused
astronauts Alan Shephard and Ed Mitchell on Apollo 14 to fall
,somewhat short of an important scientific objective. In the interest
of safety, the flight director of that mission instructed the
astronauts to abandon their attempt to reach the lip of Cone
Crater when some difficulty was encountered in locating it. The
use of an LRV on that mission would have easily solved their
problem since it was designed to transl_Jrt a relatively fatigue-
free astronaut to a selected location through the use of an on-
tx_ard navigatkm system. Table 1 compares the LRV performance
of the final three Apollo missions with that of Apollo 14, which
had no LRV but did have a-lunar cart that was pulled by the
astronauts and contained their tools and sample collection
TABLE 1. Lunar Roving Vehicle performance comparison.
Apollo Apollo Apollo Apollo
14 15 16 17
Driving time (hr:min) N/A 3:02 3:26 4:26
Surface distance traversed 3.3 17.3 16.6 22.3
(miles) (estimated)
EVA duration (hr:min) 9:23 18:33 21:00 2130
Average speed (mph) N/A 5.7 4.8 5.0
Max range from LEM Unknown 3.1 2.8 4.7
(miles) EVA #2
Longest EVA traverse 1.5 7.75 7.2 12.5
(miles) (estimated) EVA #2
Rock samples returned (lb) 94 170 213 249
containers. The use of LRVs on each of the last three Apollo
missions enabled the astronauts to cover significantly larger areas,
accomplish more seientific physical work, and accumulate much
more information about the Moon than what had been pre_Jously
accumulated in the combined rock samples from the prior three
missions that had landed on the Moon (Apollo 11, 12, and 14).
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
The LRV became affectionately known as a "dune buggy," a
"moon buggy," the "moon car," etc. It was compared to a golf
cart and a small car. The lact is that none of these characteri-
zations was accurate. Although deceptively simply in appearance,
the LRV in reality was a highly ,specialized and complex sophis-
ticated vehicle more aptly described by using the terminology
"manned spacecraft on wheels."
The vehicle was designed to be operated in the harsh vacuum
of space and with temperature extremes on the lunar surface of
±250°E Because of anticipated physiological problems with the
astronauts' depth perception on the Moon, landing on the Moon
at low sun angles was considered a necessary constraint in mission
planning. This consideration, therefore, meant that the LRV
needed to be designed with a capability to operate in the deep
shadows of the mountain ranges for substantial periods of time
when temperatures could still be at -200°F to -250°F during the
lunar morning. Although intentional use of LRV operation in the
shadows was not planned in the mission time line, given all the
unknowns of the lunar environment, it did not seem appropriate
to constrain the LRV design to only the warm, sunlit portions of
the Moon. Thus, even if low weight considerations would not have
eliminated the use of traditional rubber tires, the temperature and
vacuum constraints did. Figure l shows LRV # 1 on the lunar .sur-
face.
The LRV had to be designed for maximum static and d}Tmmic
stability while simultaneously minimizing weight and w)lume. The
stability and weight design considerations were constrained by the
requirement that the LRV be capahle of carrying two astronauts,
tools, science equipment, cameras, television and audio transmis-
sion equipment, as well as the weight of the collected rock and
soil samples. All this added up to approximately 1100 Ibm, which
represented considerably more than twice the empty weight of
the LRV itself. (By comparison, the average automobile can only
"safely carry about half its own weight.) In addition, the vehicle
had to remain static_.lly stable on slopes of up to 45 ° .
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Fig. 1. Lunar Roving Vehicle # ! on the lunar surface during Apollo 15 mission.
Other major design drivers included the requirements that the
vehicle be capable of carrying two astronauts in their spacesuits
and be operated by either the left- or right-seated astronaut.
Because of the extremely limited motions an astronaut had in a
pressurized spacesuit, a conventional steering wheel was ruled out
in favor of a T-shaped hand controller positioned in front of and
between the astronauts. The small limited storage volume cff 35 ft _
available to carry the LRV to the Moon (stowed in a quadrant
of the LM descent stage) presented a major design challenge. The
solution to the dilemma of the small storage volume available vs.
the desire to have a very wide base vehicle for stability purposes
resulted in a "folded package" concept for the vehicle (Fig. 2).
The final result was like unfolding a vehicle the size of a
minicompact car to approximately the dimensions of a full size
automobile.
The reliability factors also were a strong design driver.
Reliability was attained through a combination of simplicity of
design and operations and through redundancy. The redundancy
aspect was expressed as a requirement that "no single point
failure shall abort the mission and no second failure endanger the
crew." This requirement resulted in two independent steering
systems (front and rear), two independent battery systems (each Fill. 2. Lunar Roving Vehicle folded prior to installation in I.M.
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with sufficient energy to power the vehicle), dual hand controller
potentiometers, etc. Circuit and logic protection techniques were
also incorporated into the design. These techniques were circuit
breakers, velocity limits on changing motor rotation direction, and
power interrupt during braking and hand controller return to
neutral for steering command. The capability for switching any
of the steering or traction drive systems to either, or both,
batteries was provided along with independent drive motors for
each wheel.
Yet another major design requisite was the consideration that
the lunar dust could be a troublesome factor. Remember, very
little technical data on the soil characteristics of the Moon were
known during the entire development period of the LRV. Attention
to the potential dust hazard resulted in designing fenders to
prevent the detx_iting of a "rooster tail" of dust on the vehicle
and crew. All moving parts had to be protected against dust,
including hermetically sealing the wheel drive motors and traction
drive assemblies. Even the slighest coating of dust on thermally
radiating surfaces would materially degrade their thermal
performance. Thus, during all operations of the LRV, dust covers
had to be provided over the radiating surfaces, necessitating
storage of the heat until completion of the extravehicular activity
(EVA). When the vehicle was parked and the astronauts prepared
for their sleep period in the LM, the radiating surfaces of the LRV
could then be uncovered and heat rejected to space.
One last major design essential that further confirms the case
for the LRV being a "spacecraft on wheels" had to do with the
necessity of having a navigation system on board. If EVAs that took
the astronauts well out of line of slight of the LM were indeed
to be carried out, it would be necessary for the astronauts to
know not only where they were at any given moment, but also
their most direct route back to the safety of the LM in case of
an emergency. Following their tire tracks back to the LM would,
of course, have been possible, but would undoubtedly not have
been the fastest way to return.
SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION
Figure 3 is a photograph of the flight vehicle LRV # 1 prior to
final acceptance and shipment to KSC for installation into
Apollo 15's LM. It consisted of several major subsystems (Fig. 4)
that will be diseussed. They are the mobility subsystem, the crew
station subsystem, the navigation subsystem, the thermal control
subsystem, the electrical power subsystem, and the space support
equipment or deployment subsystem.
Mobility Subsystem
The mobility subsystem consisted of a three-piece aluminum
chassis, four wheels with wire tread tires and independent
traction drive assemblies mounted in each hub, a suspension
system, a front and rear steering system, and a hand controller
with associated drive control electronics system (DCE). With the
exception of the chassis subsystem, the rest of these subsystems
were designed, developed, and delivered by the General Motors
Delco Electronics Division in Santa Barbara, California, under
subcontract to the Boeing Company, who was the prime
contractor.
Chassis. The chassis (Fig. 5) provided by the Boeing
Company consisted of three separate sections: the forward, center,
and aft portions. The forward portion suplx)rted the LRV batteries,
drive control electronics, and navigation electronics and con-
Fig. 3. Lunar Roving Vehicle #1 prior to deliver), to KSC for installation
on Apollo 15,
tained mechanical provisions for mounting a power package and
antenna for television transmission. The center chassis provided
the support for the two astronauts and their fold-down seals, foot
rests, the hand controller, the control and display console, and
the omnidirectional antenna for voice communication. The aft
chassis was used essentially as a platform with mechanical tie-
down points for the astronaut tools and scientific equipment,
including storage of the lunar material to be collected. (The
power package and antenna on the forward chassis, the voice
antenna on the center chassis, and scientific equipment and tools
on the aft chassis were equipment that was delivered by the
Johnson Space Center and installed on the vehicle by the
astronauts after the LRV was deployed on the lunar surface. )
All three sections of the chassis were constructed of welded
aluminum joined together by hinges. Torsion springs were
installed at the forward hinges and were used to assist in unfolding
the LRV during deployment on the lunar surface. In a similar
manner, torsion bars were used at the aft chassis hinge and .served
a similar purpose as the torsion springs.
Because minimizing weight was so critical to the design, very
careful machining was accomplished on the rectangular tube
sections as well as on the chassis fittings in order to remove every
unneeded pound of weight. Load testing of the chassis was very
critical to confirm the strength of the design, since the analytical
techniques alone of these complicated shapes would have
necessitated excessive conservatism and, thus, excessive weight.
The floor of the center chasis was made of 2024 beaded
aluminum and was capable of supporting the full weight of both
astronauts, each wearing a portable life support system in the
lunar gravity environment. Here again, with the minimum weight
factor being so critical, the LRV overall structure could not have
supported the weight of the astronauts in the Earth gravity
environment without structural failure. For astronaut training
purposes, a special 1-g trainer had to be designed and built as
part of this program (Fig. 6).
Wheel deM, gn, The diameter of the wheel depicted in Fig. 7
was approximately 32 in; it was 9 in wide, and weighed a mere
12 Ibm It was constructed using a spun aluminum hub attached
to a traction drive assembly at the inner core and a titanium
More.: Lu.ar roving vehicle 623
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"bump stop" inside a woven mesh of zinc-coated steel wire
(O.033-in diameter) to which a tread made of titanium was
riveted in a chevron pattern. Testing with simulated lunar soil at
the Government's Waterways Experiment Station at Vicksburg,
Mississippi, showed that a chevron pattern that covered 50% of
the contact area was optimum and would provide sufficient
traction to climb slopes of 20 ° to 25 ° without detrimental wheel
slip. Endurance testing showed that at vehicle speeds of up to
14 km/hr, rocks with heights as great as 12 in could be struck
without wheel or suspension system failure.
Traction drive. The traction drive unit (Fig. 8) attached at
the center of the wheel hub consisted of a 1/4 hp series-wound
(36 V) dc brush-type drive motor assembly connected directly to
a "harmonic drive" assembly with an equivalent of 80:1 gear
reduction. The motor and harmonic drive was a totally welded
unit, hermetically sealed, and pressurized with nitrogen at 7.5 lb/
in 2. Thus, the welded pressurized unit not only provided
protection from the lunar dust, but also aided in transferring heat
to the hub where it could radiate into space.
The harmonic drive seen in Fig. 9 utilized a unique, yet simple,
principle. It converted high speed-tow torque to low speed-high
torque. The output of the traction drive motor is connected to
a wave generator that caused a continuous wave form to be
transferred to a flexible spline. A significant gear reduction ratio
was developed by having two less teeth on the flexible spline than
on the circular spline, thus avoiding the necessity for providing
a much heavier conventional gear reduction mechanism.
Incorporated into each traction drive assembly was a magnetic
reed switch that activated nine times during a single wheel
rotation. The pulses generated in this manner were subsequently
used in the odometer, speed, and navigation calculations. It might
be mentioned here that the use of the harmonic drive principle
did not evoke out of the space program, but rather from the shoe
machinery business in this country.
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Fig. 8. Traction drive assembly.
To prevent disabling the LRV because of a traction drive
assembly Failure, design provision was made to enable manual
decoupling of the wheel from the traction drive and brake. This
was accomplished by pulling the decoupling ring seen in Figs. 7
and 8 with a part from the two tripods left over from the LRV
deployment operation. (A portion of one of these tripods doubled
as a special tool to accomplish this decoupling.) Once decoupled
from the traction drive assembly, the wheel could be left to "free
wheel," around the traction drive assembly. The remaining three
engaged traction drive assemblies provided the drive power to the
operational wheels. Analytically, it was shown that the LRV could
be driven in an emergency mode with only one of the four
traction drive assemblies engaged (three wheels "free wheeling").
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Fig. 9. Harmonic drive.
Braking was accomplished via a cable connecting the hand
controller and the mechanical shoe and drum system on each of
the four wheeLs (Fig. 10). In addition to normal drive braking,
the system was also set by the hand controller as a parking brake.
In the event of a brake lock-up, possible sag as the result of
excessive temperature from extra lengthy parking under adverse
solar heat load, or excessive use of brakes during driving, the
brakes could be released from the park position by a pull-ring
mounted below the hand controller.
Steering. In an effort to reduce total power needs, increase
maneuverability, and provide redundancy in all critical systems,
the front and rear wheels were designed with independent,
modified Ackerman steering subsystems. Each subsystem consisted
of a small 0. l-hp, series-wotlrld, split-field, 500-rpm motor driving
through a 257:1 gear reduction into a segment gear that
connected with each traction drive motor by steering arms and
a tie rod. This independent front and rear steering system
permitted a vehicle turning radius of 122in "wall-to-wall,"
enabling the LRV to turn within its own length (Fig. 11). A
steering vane attached between the chassis and the steering arms
allowed the extreme steering angles required for the short turning
radius. Steering response was rapid, requiring only 5.5 sec from
lock to lock, with reversals accomplished by switching field
windings through the hand controller subsystem. The beauty of
the modified double Ackerman system was that it allowed the rear
wheeLs to always track the front wheeLs, even in the sharpest of
turns, thus providing maximum maneuverability while minimizing
the power required for locomotion.
In the event of a steering malfunction, or in the event that the
steering would have been overly sensitive, the astronauts had the
capability to electrically turn off either the front or rear steering.
In addition, the astronauts could mechanically disengage and lock
either front or rear steering by pulling a ring on the side of the
chassis and mechanically locking the steering system in the center
• RIGHT/LEFTSTEER .___ _ / ¢ _,
Fig. 10. Hand controller/brake cable system.
DOUBLEACKERMANN STEERING
CAPABILITY VERIFIED BY ACTUAL MEASUREMENT
ON QUAL AND FLIGHT #1 VEHICLES
Fig. 11. Steering assembly.
position. If it were necessat 3, to reengage following the
disengagement of either steering subsystem, this could have been
accomplished through the use of a special tool carried on the
LRV. All this redun "dancy seemed like a large price to pay; however,
as the reader may recall, the entire first EVA on Apollo 15 had
to be conducted with rear steering only. Although the steering
malfunction was resolved during the rest period between EVA.s,
a significant impact to the mission would have resulted if the LRV
had to be dropped from EVA # 1 due to lack of steering capability.
su,penMon. The remaining suspension elements completing
the mobility system consisted of a dual A-frame attached from the
hub of each wheel to the ch;Ls,sis via two torsion bars and a shock
absorber (Figs. 12 and 13). The torsion bars of different sizes
provided ride comfort by reacting the dynamic driving loads into
the chassis structure. More than 80% of the load was reacted by
the longer of the two torsion bars. The smaller bar served
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Fig. 12. Lunar Roving Vehicle suspension system.
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Fig. 13. Lunar Roving Vehicle suspension system.
primarily as a deployment aid during the initial unfolding
operations and was the only one of the two bars loaded while
in the stowed position. This approach limited any "creep"
tendency of the bar material and/or assembly to the secondary
(smaller) torsion bar, thus leaving the primary bar unloaded until
the vehicle was ready for driving. Each wheel also had a linear
piston damper or shock absorber that was somewhat telescoped
during storage and then extended upon deployment. The linear
piston damper was selected due to its design simplicity, light
weight, and efficient loading of the suspension structure.
Drive control electronics (DCE). The DCE package was
located on the forward chassis of the vehicle and was the
electronic heart of the mobility system. This package accepted
forward and reverse speed control signals as well as left or right
steering commands through a process called "pulse _Sdth
modulation" (Figs. 14 and 15). It featured redundant circuitry and
dual power supplies. The DCE provided signal processing logic
to pulse width modulators that in turn furnished energy to both
the traction drive and steering motors. The square-wave pulse,
providing power to the traction drive, varied in width, thereby
varying applied power as a function of the speed command from
the hand controller potentiometers. The traction drive motors
pulse rate was 1500 Hz, whereas that of the steering motors was
10,000 Hz. Heat generation from the DCE had to be stored until
after the completion of an EVA in order to prevent heat radiation
surfaces from being impaired in their function by dust accumu-
lations. More will be said about this in the discussion of the
thermal control system.
Crew Station Subsystem
The LRV crew station subsystem (Fig. 16) consisted of two
foldable seats, two seat belts, two foldable foot rests, a hand
controller, one arm rest behind the hand controller, inboard and
outboard hand holds, two toe holds, and the control and display
console. In addition, fenders for the wheels and the floor panels
of the center chassis were considered as part of the crew station.
They were required primarily because the LRV was manned.
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Fig. 15. Drive control circuit block diagram.
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The LRV's seats and foot rests were folded flat onto the chassis
during preflight installation and were deployed by the astronauts
upon reaching the lunar surface. The seats were of tubular
aluminum construction spanned by nylon strips and, together with
the back, supported and restrained the astronauts' portable life-
support system (PISS) from sideways and vertical motion while
driving. Cutouts were provided in the seat bottoms to enable
access to the PLSS flow control valves at all times. Seat belts were
made of nylon webbing with an adjustable web section and a
metal hood that snapped over the outboard hand hold for quick
ingress and egress activity.
A toe hold on each side of the vehicle was used to aid the
astronauts in getting in and out of the vehicle. Toe holds were
incorporated as the result of early KC-135 flights simulating the
1/6-g environment of the Moon. These tests showed rather
conclusively that the astronauts required the assistance of a toe
hold in order to be able to quickly assume the seated position
on the vehicle. The toe hold then could serve as a removable tool
in order to activate the wheel decoupling mechanism should
circumstances have arisen that required such action. The toe
holds themselves were assembled on the lunar surface by
dismantling two tripods that connected the LRV to the IAi while
in the stowed position. These were then inserted into receptacles
located on each side of the chassis.
Hand co_. All functions relating to steering, speed
control, braking, etc. were handled by a T-shaped hand controller
located between the two astronauts and just aft of the control
and display console (Fig. 17). Tilting the controller forward of
the neutral position proportionally increased forward speed.
Reverse power was applied when the controller was tilted
backwards past the neutral position after a reverse inhibit switch
on the side of the hand controller was activated by the astronaut.
With the reverse inhibit switch in the down position, the
controller could only be pivoted forward for forward driving. With
the ,switch in the upward position, the LRV could be operated
in reverse. Braking was initiated when the controller was pulled
backward. At approximately 3 in of aft travel, a spring-loaded catch
engaged the handle to lock in the "park" position. Forward and
reverse power was cut off when the braking action began. A
simple tilting of the hand controller to the left released the
parking brake.
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CONTROL&
DISPLAYCONSOLE
REVERSE INHIBIT SWITCH
HAND CONTROLLER
Moving the controller left or right caused the vehicle to steer
left or right, respectively. As the controller was spring-loaded, it
would return to the neutral steering position when released. The
hand controller moved a .series of redundant potentiometers
located in its base, which were used to apply command bias
signals to the DeE package for all drive and steering commands.
The exception to this electronic drive control was the braking
function, which applied tetxsion to the brake control cables
mechanically, as previously di_ussed.
Control and display (C&D) console. The C&D console
consisted of an upper portion containing navigation system
instruments and a lower portion containing controls for .switching
and monitoring electrical loads. To enable easy reading of the
irLstruments and switches in shadows, the panel markings were
irradiated with promethium 147. Located on the upper left side
of the cortsole was an attitude indicator (AI) that provided pitch
and roll information within a range of +25 °. In the tx)sition shown
in Fig. 18, upslope ([l) or downslope (D) attitude could be read.
Roll angles were obtained by rotating this indicator forward. This
action exposed a "roll" ,'ale to the left crewman. This indication
was read by the crew and retx)rted to Mission Control Center
(MCC) during navigation update where, with ephemeris data,
vehicle heading could be determined. The vehicle attitude data
were used by MCC to correct the sun shadow device readings
if the LRV was not level. This sun shadow device, located in the
upper portion of the cortsole, helped determine the LRV heading
with respect to the sun and was compared with the directional
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Fig. 18. Electrical power distribution diagram.
gyro as check against gyro drift. When lifted into position, the
sun shadow device would cast a shadow on a graduated scale,
the value of which was radioed to MCC during navigation updates.
Also located in the upper portion of the C&D console was a
heading indicator (HI) that displayed LRV heading with respect
to lunar north, a bearing indicator (BI) that always showed a
bearing directly back to the LM, a range indicator (RI) that always
showed distance directly back to the LM, and a distance indicator
(DI) that showed distance traveled in increments of 0.1 kin. This
information was obtained from the navigation signal processing
unit (SPU) located on the forward chassis that in turn received
its signal from the third-fastest traction drive odometer. The third
fastest odometer value was selected to ndnimize errors caused by
wheel slippage and/or to insure against using the output impulses
from a wheel that was decoupled and "free wheeling."
The gryro torquing switch was used to adjust the HI during
navigation updates. The NAV power circuit breaker was used to
route power from the main buses to the navigation susbsystem.
The power distribution was designed in such a way as to enable
power for the navigation system to be obtained from both
batteries simultaneously. This would prevent a critical failure in
the event that one battery failed (.see electrical power distribution
diagram, Fig. 18)•
A speed indicator (SI) depicted LRV speed from 0 to 20 km/
hr and utilized pulses only from the right rear wheel. The system
reset .switch was used to reset the bearing, distance, and range
digital displays to zero. Lastly, sitting on top of the console was
a caution and warning flag used to give the crewmen a visual
warning if either battery or if any traction drive motor were
overheating. The spring-loaded flag was held down by an
electromagnet whose circuit was designed to open in the event
of an overheat problem (exceeding 125°F on either battery or
400°F on any drive motor). Should this have occurred, the flag
would have immediately popped into full view of the astronauts.
The lower portion of the console contained a power section,
a power/temperature monitor section, a steering section, a drive
section, and a drive enable section. The power section consisted
of circuit breakers that connected the batteries to the main power
buses, the auxiliary outlet circuit breaker for power to the
communications relay unit, and the circuit breakers and control
switch for the ±15 Vdc power to the pulse-width modulators.
With four main power buses, any drive motor, steering motor, etc.
could be connected to either battery, thus providing full
redundancy.
The power/temperature monitor section provided the stants of
the vehicle's electrical system and temperature of batteries and
motors. Battery voltage and current flow from either battery could
be displayed when the crewman used the appropriate volts-amps
switch position. Similarly, the position of the drive motor
temperature select switch determined whether the rear or front
wheel motors were to be displayed. In addition, a battery amp-
hour integrator meter was provided, which displayed the
remaining battery capacity (set at 121 amp-hours prior to the first
LRV use on the EVA).
The steering section contained a switch and a circuit breaker
for each of the two steering motors. S'tmilarly, the drive and power
section had circuit breakers and switches for each of the four
drive motors. The remaining secUon was for drive enable. This
section contained a switch for each drive motor that permitted
the astronaut to select either pulse width modulator ([rkVM 1 or
2). As previously discussed, the PWMs provided speed control
signals for each motor. The switch just above this section enabled
the astronaut to select PWM 1, 2, or both. Here again, redundancy
was the uppermost consideration throughout the design. Any
motor could be supplied by any PWM, or all motors could be
driven from one PWM.
Navigation Subsystem
The navigation system consisted of three major components.
They were the directional gyro (DG), odometers on each traction
drive assembly that provided distance and speed information, and
a small solid state computer. The navigation subsystem was based
on the principle that when starting a sortie from a known point,
entering speed, direction, and distance traveled information into
an onboard computer, and then computing vehicle position from
these data by solving a relatively simple trigonometric problem,
would provide bearing and distance back to the LM (Fig. 19).
Inputs to the navigation subsystem were changes in the LRV
direction with respect to lunar north (obtained from the DG)
and odometer pulses that were obtained from the wheel rotation
of the third fastest wheel. For each increment of distance
measured by the odometer circuitry, the signal processing unit
(SPU) would calculate the east-west and north-south distances
traveled based on vehicle heading data obtained from the gyro.
These distances were summed with related distances already in
the registers, and range and bearing to the LM automatically
calculated and then displayed on the C&D console (see prior
discussion ).
The overall accuracy requirements of the navigation system
were that the system needed to be capable of determining the
bearing to the LM relative to lunar north within ±6 ° at a radius
of 5 km from the LM. In addition, the distance from the LR to
the LM had to be within ±600 m, again at a radius of 5 km. The
system had to be capable of displaying the distance traveled at
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Fig. 19. Navigation system block diagram.
any point in the traverse to an accuracy of :t_2%. (These
requirements were met on the lunar surface with considerable
mat_.)
Reverse operation of the vehicle produced some error as the
odometer logic could not distinguish forward or reverse wheel
rotation. Thus, odometer pulses generated while operating the
vehicle in reverse were seen by the SPU as forward motion.
Although this would undoubtedly introduce some error, it was
determined that the error would be so minor that it was not
worth the extra cost, weight, and complexity to design into the
SPU a network that would allow such correction.
Thermal Control Subsystem
The LRV made use of a passive and semipassive system of
thermal control (Fig. 20). The system included special surface
finishes, space radiators, multilayer insulation, thermal straps, and
fusible mass heat sinks. At liftoff from the Cape, LRV storage
volume temperatures were maintained at 70°F + 5°E Insulation
and reflective coatings were used to control the heat loss of
various critical components during boost, Earth orbit, translunar
flight, and lunar landing. It was important for the batteries to be
maintained between 40°F and 125°E Other equipment had wider
temperature tolerances between -30 ° F and 185 ° E
The basic concept of thermal control on the lunar surface
consisted primarily of storing heat during vehicle operation and
rejecting heat to deep space by radiation while the vehicle was
parked between EVAs. Thus, during operation, heat generated was
stored in heat sinks consisting of two LRV batteries and tanks
containing wax-like phase change material. At the completion ¢)f
an EVA, the astronauts would park the vehicle in a specific
orientation with respect to the sun in order to achieve the most
favorable cool-down attitude and then lift three dust covers from
the forward chassis, exposing fused silica second-surface mirrors
that were the heat radiating surfaces. The radiators had to be
totally covered during LRV operation to prevent dust accumula-
tions, which would effectively destroy the radiation properties of
the mirror. When opened by the astronauts, the dust covers were
held open by a throw-over locking mechanism. During the
astronauts' rest/sleep period between EVAs, the heat stored by the
batteries and the tanks containing the phase change material
would be rejected to space. This heat rejection would continue
until battery temperatures came down to 45°F (+5°F), at which
time a bimetallic spring device would disengage the throw-over
latch, allowing the covers to be closed automatically.
During LRV operation, the covers provided dust protection to
the DCE, the SPU, the DGU, and the LRV batteries. Passive
protection was provided by multilaycred aluminized mylar and
nylon netting insulation blankets w4th a "beta cloth" (polished
#ass) outer layer that was necc_,_ary to protect against wear and
direct solar impingement.
Instruments on the C&D console were mounted on an
aluminum plate that was isolated from the rest of the vehicle
through the use of fibergl;ts,s mounts. The external surfaces of the
console were coated with a heat-resistant paint, with the face
plate being black anodized for temperature control while
reducing reflections that were annoying to the astronauts. Heat
generated by each of the traction drive assemblies and the shock
absorber (linear dampers) was radiated to space through the
hubcap disk and the casing, respectively. The pressurized gas
inside each of the traction drive assemblies aided in this process
of heat rejection.
Electrical Power Subsystem
This subsystem consisted of two 36-V silver-zinc batteries, a
wire distribution s3_tem, connectors, circuit breakers, switches,
and meters (Fig. 18). Both LRV batteries were designed for
minimum weight and consisted of plexiglass monoblock
(common cell wall) construction, 23 cells with silver-zinc plates,
tx_t,xs.sium hydroxide as the electrolyte, and a magnesium case.
The batteries were rated at 121 amp-hours each and were
nornmUy operated simultaneously with approximately equal loads.
As previously diseussed, through selective sa_itching at the control
and display console, the total or any part of the electrical load
could be carried by either battery alone. The batteries were
located on the forward chassis and were enclosed by thermal
blankets and dust covers. Each battery was protected from
Fig. 20. Portion (ff thermal control _tem.
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excessive internal pressure by a relief valve and from excessive
temperatures by monitoring at the C&D console during operation
and radiators exposed between .sorties, as previously discussed
under the Thermal Control section. Because the batteries were
used as heat sinks (battery #1 was connected by thermal straps
to the navigation system's SPU and battery #2 to the navigation
s3,_tem's DG), careful monitoring and control of their tempera-
tures was essential.
Stowage and Deployment Subsystem
Because of the stability requirements for a two-man vehicle and
the volumetric constraints dictated by the LM and upper-stage
fairing, it was necessary that the LRV be transported to the Moon
stored in a folded configuration and then deployed after arrival
on the lunar surface. Figure 21 shows the LRV in the typical folded
position just prior to installation and integration into the LM. In
the LM, the folded LRV was supported and secured by space-
support equipment that also served to deploy the vehicle once
on the Moon.
The space-support and deployment equipment had to be
designed with sufficient capability to enable a deployment of the
LRV to take place in less than 15 rain (worst case) with the LM
tilted at any angle up to 14.5 ° in any direction and with the
bottom of the descent stage anywhere from 14 in to 62 in above
the lunar surface.
This support and deployment mechanism, shown in Fig. 22,
consisted of cables, shock absorbers, pin retraction mechanisms,
telescoping tubes, push off rods, and other pieces required to
deploy the vehicle. The actual deployment was accomplishcd by
the astronaut pulling on two nylon tapes. While standing on the
LM access ladder, the first step by the astronaut was to pull a
"D"-handle. This action served to retract three pins holding the
LRV to the attach points, thus freeing the LRV for the deployment
sequence. A spring-loaded push-off rod, shown in the upper
portion of Fig. 22, thus began to move the folded vehicle away
from the top of the LM storage bay by some 5 in until it was
stopped by two steel deployment cables.
At this point the astronaut descended the LM access ladder,
walked around to the LRV's fight side, and began to unreel the
nylon tape in a hand-over-hand manner, slowly lowering the
vehicle to the surface (see sequence in Fig. 23). After approxi-
mately 15 ° of deployment motion, the lower end of the vehicle
was rotated onto the two lower points just outside the bay formed
by tripods attached to the LRV's center chassis. As the chassis
reached approximately 45 ° in rotation, release pins on the
forward and aft chassis were automatically pulled. This action
caused the aft wheels to unfold, assisted by torsion bars, until
latched and locked. The astronaut continued unwinding the tape
until, at approximately 73 ° of rotation from the LM, the forward
chassis and wheels were automatically deployed and locked. At
the 73 ° point in the deployment, a cam released latches on the
support arms, which served as the rotation axis allowing the
telescoping tubes to extend further, thus holding the LRV away
from the LM.
At this point the astronaut pulled the second operating tape
located on the left side of the LM quadrant, allowing the forward
end of the LRV to be gently lowered to the surface and causing
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the telescoping tubes attached between the LRV and the LM to
guide the LRV away from the LM. This action was followed by
the astronaut pulling a release lanyard at the forward chassis' left
side, allowing the telescoping tubes to fall away.
After the LRV was disconnected from the LM and space support
and deployment equipment, the astronauts would insert toe holds,
erect seats and foot rests, deploy wheel fender extensions, release
seat belts, and remove docking pins and latches from several
places on the vehicle.
At this point, one astronaut powered up the LRV, confirmed
all controls were working properly, and then proceeded to back
the vehicle away from the LM and drive it to the side of the LM
where the auxiliary equipment was stored. The vehicle was
powered down and the auxiliary equipment mounted on the LRV.
This included the lunar communications relay unit (LCRU), the
ground control television cameras assembly (_), the voice
and television antennas, and the aft pallet containing most of the
hand tools and science instruments needed for the sorties.
SUMMARY
in summary, there are two salient issues worth re-emphasizing.
The first deals with the initial purlx)se of the paper: to revisit the
l_tV design and program in .some ._cific detail in order to
provide contemporary space exploration planners with an
opportunity to become more knowiedgable of this "s'pacccraft on
wheels," which operated so successfully on three separate
missions to the Moon. Conceivably, by some m_xlifications to this
vehicle or by some evolutionary redesign, this vehicle could
possibly satisfy requirements for a roving vehicle inferred by the
potential new national thrusts in space. It is hoped that this paper
might be the catalyst to spark a renaissance for the LRV.
The .second point deals with the _tlidit T of the terminology
"spacecraft on wheels," which was referred to early in the paper.
What may have been viewed as a locomotion device truly
embodied the sophistication of a spacecraft, as supported by the
detail provided in this paper. The astronauts who had the privilege
Fig. 23. Deployment sequence.
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of driving this machine on the lunar surface [D. Scott, J. Irwin
(Fig. 24), C. Duke, J. Young, G. Cernan, and J. Schmitt] all had
very positive comments about its handling, performance,
reliability, and the sort of machine the LRV was, In fact, the
superlatives flowed quite easily in all the mission debriefings. The
crew of Apollo 17 (G. Ceman and J. Schmitt), upon their return
to Earth, had nothing but praise for the LRV:
"The Rover performed admirably.., that vehicle that sits
out there at Taurus Littrow--We talked an awful lot about
having two good spacecraft, but we told ourselves that we
had three good spacecraft. That thing couldn't perform
better--and we pushed it in many cases to the limit. But
let me tell you that vehicle for a long time was just a little
bit better than we were because it's a super performing
vehicle. If you take a couple more batteries up there, that
thing would just keep going..." (emphasis added )
Such #owing testimonials from the men who used the LRV
offer more compelling arguments for its merits than this paper
could hope to do. Fig. 24. Astronaut Irwin with rover at Apollo 15 landing site
